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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In

December

of

1982f

after

a

jury

trial

before

the

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinsonf in the Third Judicial District Court
of

Summit County, State of Utah, respondent Dalbo, Inc., was

awarded a judgment of $199,500.00 against appellant, Martin R.
Lingwall.

Thereafter, appellant

filed a Motion

for Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict or Alternatively for a New Trial.
Order was subsequently
denying said motion.

An

entered by the Court on June 7, 1984,

It is from this Order that the appellant now

appeals.
For
referred

purposes

to

as

of

this

appeal, Martin Lingwall will be

plaintiff/appellant

and

Dalbo,

Inc., will

be

referred to as defendant/respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant petitions this Court to reverse the District
Court's denial of plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial and asks that
this case be remanded for a new trial to be conducted in accordance
with the opinion of this Court.
FACTS
On September 5, 1981, an accident occurred on a road near
Chalk Creek Canyon, Summit County, Utah. (Tr. 24, 27-30; R. 5, 16.)
The accident involved a collision between a truck and a motorcycle.
(R. 5, 16.) The truck was owned by Dalbo, Inc. (R. 5, 16.)

It was

driven by an employee of Dalbo, Dale Randolph Peel, in the course
of his employment. (Tr. 30; R. 5, 16.)
by Martin

R.

Lingwall

with

Annette

Lingwall as a passenger. (R. 5, 16.)

The motorcycle was driven
Belden

riding behind Mr.
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This action was originally commenced by Annette Belden as
plaintiff

against

defendants,

Dale

Dale
Peel

Peel
and

and

Dalbol

Dalbo,

Inc.

(R.

Inc., filed

a

1.)

The

third-party

complaint against third-party defendant Martin R. Lingwall claiming
a right to contribution. (R. 5, 16.) Third-party defendant

Martin

R. Lingwall counterclaimed for damages against Dale Peel and Dalbo,
Inc. (R. 22.) The matters at issue between Annette Belden and Dale
Peel and Dalbo, Inc., were settled out of court and a stipulation
was entered into by all parties and filed| with the court prior to
trial. (R. 88.)
Trial on the action commenced November 30, 1982.

During

the proceeding and over the objection of plaintiff's counsel, the
Court allowed testimony to be heard by the jury regarding Mr.
Lingwall's extra-marital
183-185.)

relationship with Annette Belden. Tr.

At the close of evidence the jury was given instruction

and began its deliberations.
to reach

a verdict

the

(Tr. 515; ij. 203-245.)

jury became

comparative negligence. (R. 266, 277.)
additional

instruction

and

referred

It requested

confused.

additional instruction regarding the ejffect of

While trying

its finding of

The Court declined to give
t|he

jury

to

instructions

already given. (R. 266, 277.)
The

jury

returned

the

special verdict as follows

(R.

246-248.):
1.

At the time and place in question and under the

conditions as shown by the evidence were Dalbo, Inc.
and Dale Randolph Peel negligent
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ANSWER: Yes.
2.

Was such negligence the proximate cause of the

accident?
ANSWER: Yes.
3.

At the time and place in question and under the

conditions as shown by the evidence, was Martin R.
Lingwall negligent?
ANSWER: Yes.
4.

Was such negligence of Martin R. Lingwall the

proximate cause of his own injuries?
ANSWER: Yes.
5.

If you have answered questions 2 and 4 "Yes", then

answer this question:

Considering all the negligence

that caused the accident at One Hundred Percent (100%),
what percentage of that negligence is attributable to:
(a) Dalbo, Inc. and Dale R. Peel:

30%

(b) Martin R. Lingwall:

70%

(c) Total:
6.

100%

Set forth the amount of damages that you find

Martin R. Lingwall has suffered as a result of the
injuries received in the accident in question:
Lost Income (present):

$28,000.00

Lost Income (future):

20,000.00

Medical Expenses:

16,083.00

General Damages:

5,000.00

Total:

$69,083.00
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7.

At the time the accident occurred was the road

where it occurred:
(a) A public road, or
(b) A private road?
ANSWER:

A private road.

Based on this verdict, Mr. LingWall was non-suited and
ordered

to

pay

Dalbof

Inc.

$199,500.00

on

it's

claim

for

contribution. (R. 246-248? 252.)
Plaintiff

then

moved

the

District

Court

Notwithstanding the Verdict or New Trial. (R. 261.)

for

Judgment

Both motions

were denied. (R. 295.)
Plaintiff now appeals to this Ccjurt for relief from the
decision of the District Court, claiming ajs error the following:
1.

Error

consequences

of

in

their

not

instruction

apportionment

the

jury

as

to

the

of negligence between the

parties. (Tr. 637; R. 137, 262, 265-270.)
2.

Error in refusing to apply the holding of Dixon v.

Stewart, 658 P. 2d 591 (Utah 1982), decided while this case was
pending, to plaintiff's motion for new trial. (R. 262, 265, 270.)
Error in allowing defendants1

3.
plaintiff

at

length

regarding

his

counsel to question

personal

relationship

with

Annette Belden.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

This case was tried within one month before the Utah

Supreme Court decided Dixon v. Stewart!, supra.

Dixon held that

upon request the trial court shall instruct the jury on the direct
of their finding of comparative negligenjce.
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In the instant case, the trial court's refusal to instruct
the jury on its finding of comparative negligence led to the same
error as was found in Dixon, that being improper jury confusion
resulting in an anomalous jury verdict.
The jury's confusion in this case and in Dixon is close to
being identical.

Based on the same reasoning as expressed in

Dixon, this Court should remand this case to the District Court to
be decided in accordance with the law, as expressed in Dixon.
II.

The District Court erred in denying appellant's motion

for new trial.

The District Court biased its decision on its

refusal to give limited retroactive effect to Dixon v. Stewart,
supra, a case decided by this Court while appellant's motion was
pending before the lower court. Because the law changed before the
final judgment was entered in this case, appellant should have the
benefit of the new rule.
III.

The District Court abused its discretion in admitting

testimony concerning appellant's extra-marital relationship with
Annette Belden.

This evidence prejudiced appellant by the jury to

decide the issue of liability based on appellant's ethical conduct
rather than on whether appellant acted negligently at the time of
the accident.
ARGUMENT
At trial this suit was heard to determine the comparative
liabilities

between plaintiff, Martin Lingwall, and defendant,

Dalbo, Inc., respectively appellant and respondent on this appeal.
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After the close of evidence the jlury was instructed and
sequestered for deliberation. While trying to reach a verdict, the
jury became confused on the effect their finding of comparative
negligence would have on the parties.

In an attempt to eliminate

the confusion the foreman of the jury requested the trial court for
additional instruction.

The Court denied the request and referred

the jury to instructions already given. (Rj 266, 277.)
The jury subsequently returned a special verdict finding
Mr. Lingwall 70% negligent and Dalbo, bn, 30% negligent.

In

addition, Mr. Lingwall was found to have suffered damages totaling
$69,083.00, a

sum much

less

than

originally

prayed

for. (R.

246-248.)
Based

on

the

jury's verdict, the Trial Court entered

judgment in December, 1982.

Plaintiff, Lingwall, was non-suited

and ordered to pay defendant $199,500.Ofc) on its cross-claim for
contribution. (R. 252.)
In

interviews

with

the

juror^

after

the

trial

[See

Affidavits, Appendix A], it was revealed that (1) due to inadequate
instruction the jury had, indeed, been confused because of the
nature of the special verdict and the lack of knowledge as to what
was actually being decided; and, (2) that the jury had intended to
award Mr. Lingwall damages, but because of the Court's failure to
give

instruction

of

the

effect

of

the

jury's

finding

of

comparative negligence, they were precluded from being able to

J

properly determine the facts and submit a verdict that reflected
their desired result.
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Thereafter,

plaintiff

brought

motions

notwithstanding the verdicts and for a new trial.
anew trialf
instruct

the

negligence.
P.2d

plaintiff
jury

for

judgment

On motion for

listed as error the Court's failure to
regarding

their

finding

of

comparative

Plaintiff based his argument on Dixon v. Stewart/ 650

591 (Utah 1982), a Utah Supreme Court case decided while

plaintiff's motion was pending before the District Court.
Dixon involved a wrongful death suit brought by the family
of a pedestrian struck and fatally injured by defendant driver.
The jury found plaintiff's decedent 60% negligent and the driver of
the car that fatally injured him 40% negligent.

On appeal to this

Court, the plaintiff alleged error in the Trial Court's failure to
instruct the jury as to the consequences of the apportionment of
negligence between the parties.
In the Dixon decision the Utah Supreme Court found that
similar confusion existed among the jurors in that case as occurred
in the District Court below.
Prior to Dixon, Utah law held it was "prejudicial error if,
in a comparative negligence case, the Court instructs the jury as
to the effect or impact its fact finding answers and any special
verdict will have on the outcome of the case."

McGinn v. Utah

Power and Light Co., 529 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 1975).
The evidence demonstrates negligence on the part
of both parties. The verdict form shows that the jury
foreman originally entered the 40%-60% split in the
opposite order, that is, he showed the plaintiff as 40%
negligent and the defendant as 60% negligent.
Subsequently, a line was drawn through those two
figures and they were reversed.
In addition, the
amount entered as damages was very much reduced from
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the amount prayed for by the plaintiffs, indicating a
likelihood that the jurors thohght they were awarding
the plaintiffs an amount reduced by the percent of
their decedant's negligence.
In overruling McGinn, the Court! concluded that:
There seems to be no good reason and logic or
current law for this Court to give its sanction to the
perpetuation of such confusion.
Consequently, we
overrule the decision in McQinn, and hold that if
requested, a trial court must! inform the jury of the
effect of apportioning to the plaintiff 50% or more of
the negligence it finds in af comparative negligence
case, if the effect of such an instruction will not be
to confuse or mislead the juryj
Dixon, supra, at 31.
In the instant case, the Trial Coiirt apparently felt Dixon
had no bearing in deciding whether Mr. Li ngwall was entitled to a
new trial.

Presumably this was so because Dixon had been decided

after judgment had been entered by the Trial Court, albeit while
plaintiff's motion was pending and had rjiot been Utah law at the
time of trial.

In refusing to give Djixon limited retroactive

effect, plaintiff's motions were denied.
Plaintiff now appeals to this Cojirt to decide whether the
District Court erred in its discretion not to apply the Dixon
holding and denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

Appellant

requests this Court to grant limited retroactivity to Dixon v.
Stewart and to remand this case to the District Court to be decided
in accordance with the law announced in that decision.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE INSTRUCTED THE JURY
ON THE EFFECT OF THEIR FINDING OF COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE.
It is appellant's position that had not Dixon v. Stewart,
supra, been decided this case would have prompted the overruling of
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McGinn v. Utah Power and Light Co., supra.

In both this case and

Dixon, the confusion experienced by the jury led to an equally
severe prejudicial effect on the plaintiff.

Factually, the dilemma

faced by the two juries is almost indistinguishable.
difference

between

Dixon

and

the

case

at

bar

is

The major
that

here

defendants, in the lower court, brought a third-party claim for
contribution.
On motion for new trial brought by Mr. Lingwall in District
Court, Dalbo argued that to have instructed the jury according to
the rule announced
defendant.

in Dixon would hcive necessarily prejudiced

In giving such an instruction the jury would have been

informed of defendant's out of court settlement with Annette Belden
and the resulting claim for contribution.
this

knowledge

the

jury

would

have

Dalbo argued that from

inferred

an admission of

negligence on the defendant's part and perhaps based an estimation
of plaintiff's damages on the dollar figure in the out of court
settlement.
Appellant disagrees with this argument for the following
reasons.
At a minimum, a Dixon instruction, if appropriate, would
have informed the jury of the consequences of finding the plaintiff
50%

or more negligent.

Dixon, supra, at

596.

In such an

instruction the jury would be informed that the plaintiff would be
non-suited

if

found

primarily

negligent.

Appellant does not

dispute the unfairness to defendant had the jury been instructed of
the out of court settlement with the original plaintiff, Annette
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Belden, and the claim of contribution agaijnst the plaintiff.

But

appellant's point is that the Court could have given an instruction
that would have been fair to both parties, one that would have
allowed the jury to reach a verdict with knowledge of the result of
the apportionment of liability, as per Dixpn, by stopping short of
exposing defendant's pre-trial settlement and cross-claim
Such

an

instruction

would

confusion, as discussed in Dixon.

have

remedied

the

jury's

It would have allowed the jury

to accurately apportion liability and resulting damages in relation
to their
existence

specific
or

the

finding
amount

of facts.
of

A determination of the

defendant's

counter-claim

for

contribution, based on such a verdict, would then become a simple
matter

of accounting.

See e.g., Dessaur v. Memorial General

Hospital, 628 P.2d 337 (N.M. 1981).
It seems evident that there is as I clear a need in this case
for additional instruction as that found in Dixon.
Here it would appear that not only was the jury confused as
to what they were being asked to decide, in terms of liability, but
apparently tried to arrive at an estimate of plaintiff's damages by
computing an amount reduced by the percent of his negligence. Such
an anomalous result was found intolerable to the court in Dixon and
should be recognized as such in this case.
II. DIXON V. STEWART SHOULP BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED
TO THIS CASE WHICH WAS PENDING WHEN DIXON WAS DECIDED.
In Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Bd., 657 P.2d
257, 264 (Utah 1982), this Court recognized the various retroactive
applications given to judicial decisions!:
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The application may be to parties and facts of
the case where the new rule is announced, to pending
cases, to future initiated cases arising from earlier
events, or in some rare instances, to terminated cases
which are subject to collateral attack,

(Emphasis added)

"A decisions operative effect is treated as a function of
judicial policy [and] is left to the discretion of the Court."
Loyal Order of Moose No. 259, supra at 264.
It is plaintiff's position that because his case had not
been finally decided and was pending at the time Dixon was decided,
he should have the benefit of the new rule.

In Utah, an action is

pending until final determination on appeal or until the time to
appeal has passed.

Young et.ux. v.

Hansen et.ux., 218 P.2d 674,

675 (Utah 1950).
The

interests

of

finality

and

fairness

would

not be

threatened by giving appellant the benefit of a subsequent change
in the law.

See Andrews v. Morris, 669 P.2d 81, 95 (Utah 1983).

Appellant is aware that the Court must balance the need to
apply a decision retroactively against a situation where overruled
law has been justifiably relied upon or where retroactive operation
creates a burden.

State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmers

Insurance, 27 Utah 2d. 166, 493 P.2d 1002 (1972).

But, even though

respondent may have justifiably relied on the prior law of McGinn
during the trial phase of litigation, to deny appellant the benefit
of the Dixon decision on appeal would unfairly allow respondent the
advantage of having the entire case decided on law that has since
been overruled.

This result would seem to offend the concept of

fairness and create the greater injustice.
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III,
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING
TO
EXCLUDE
TESTIMONY
OF
APPELLANT7!?
EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH|ANNETTE BELDEN.
Appellant1 s last claim of error is based on the Trial
Court's permission allowing defendant's counsel to cross-examine
Mr. Lingwall about his involvement with Annette Belden.
Rule 45 f Utah Rules of Evidence J effective at time of
trial, provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided, the judge may in
his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighted by the
risk that its admission will, ... (b) create a
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing
the issues or of misleading th& jury.
It is appellant's position that evidence before the jury
showing appellant's extra-marital affair with Annette Belden was
infinitely more prejudicial than whatever probativeness it might
have had in determining what Mr. Lingwall's state of mind was up
until the time of the accident.
On cross examination, and over thd objection of appellant's
counsel, the following testimony was heard by the jury. (Tr. Vol.
I, p.183, In.5)
Q.

Did you get sufficient Sleep the night before so

you were alert and knew what you were doing as you were driving
just prior to the accident?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

You weren't thinking of &ny of the consequences of

being with Annette Belden as you were drijving down that road, then?
A.

No, sir.
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Q.

You weren't concerned about what your wife might

think about.
(Objection and discussion)
THE COURT:

You may proceed as far as any further

foundation.
Q.

(By Mr. Heath)

You were married at that time, were

A.

I still am.

Q.

My question to you, were you married to the woman

you not?

you are married to now at the time?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

Did you ask your wife if you could take Annette to

A.

Nof I didn't.

Q,

Dud she know Annette was with you?

A.

No, my wife was in Los Angeles.

Q.

Did you consider the fact that you would be telling

Cowboy Days?

he that you had Annette with you up in Evanston and then Elk
hunting?
A.

If she would have asked me, I would have told her.

I didn't keep any secrets.
Q.

She wouldn't have objected to that?

A.

I can't answer that question.

Q.

I see.

A.

She may have objected, yes.
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Q.

I think the question really!is, were you feeling at

all guilty about being out there without your wife and being with
another woman?
A,

No, sir.

Q.

As you were driving down?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

It didn't divert your attention?

A.

No, sir.

Admitting

evidence

of

appellantjs

extra-marital

affair

before a jury that was overwhelmingly Mormon and conservative not
only prejudiced appellant by depicting him as morally dishonest,
but

also

allowed

the

jury

to

determine

liability

based

on

appellant's ethical conduct rather than Ion whether he had acted
negligently at the time of the accident.
It is true that, in matters of determining materiality the
trial court should be accorded a large measure of discretion.
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1977), but
where this discretion has been abused the Trial Court may be
reversed.

Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d

314 (Utah 1979).
The factual issues to be decided(by the jury at trial were
I
extremely close. The accident between appellant's motorcycle and
respondent's Mack Truck took place in the middle of a one lane dirt
road.

And, because this road connected(with a public highway and

I
traversed various private properties, there was some question as to
whether the accident had taken place on (a public or private road.
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The

public-private

finding

determined

whether

Utah's,

then

constitutional, Automobile liable on respondent's cross-claim for
contribution.
Under these circumstances, the lower court should have been
more

cautious

in admitting

testimony

relationship with Annette Belden.

dealing with appellant's

In the minds of many jurors it

would have inevitably created an inference and in some cases a
presumption of wrongdoing on the part of those involved.

Once

implanted, the taint cannot help but affect a jury's decision
making

process

and

where

the

factual

issues are narrow, the

inference may mean the difference.
Here, the Court abused its discretion in failing to avoid
the tendency of the proffered evidence to mislead and prejudice the
jury.
CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned

claims of error, appellant

petitions this Court to reverse the District Court's denial of
plaintiff's motion for a new trial and to remand this case for new
trial to be conducted in accordance with the opinion of this Court.
DATED this

day of

, 1987.

Respectfully submitted,

STEVEN L. HANSEN
GREGORY B. WALL
Attorneys for Appellant
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Secretary tlo Gregory BV Wall

AFFIDAVIT OF KENT NICHOLS

KENT NICHOLS, being first duly Isworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That affiant was a member apd foreman of a jury

impaneled in the litigation of Belden v. iDalbo, Inc. , et al, ,
Civil No. 6749, commenced November 30, 19|82, before the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial District Court of
Summit County, State of Utah.
2.

That during its deliberations, said jury became

confused due to the nature of the specialj verdict and regarding
the effect their finding of contributory negligence would have
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbd>, Inc
3.

That affiant in his representative capacity as

foreman of the jury requested additional instruction from the
Court in a desire to eliminate the confusion
4.

That the Court refused the(request and, instead,

referred the jury to instructions already given,
5.

That said jury returned a special verdict estab-

lishing plaintiff Lingwall 70% negligent and defendant Dalbo,
Inc., 30% negligent.

In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was

found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident

APPENDIX A-l

6.

That the aforementioned verdict did not r e s u l t

in the effect desired by the j u r y , namely, that the p l a i n t i f f
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall
to recover some damages in compensation for his i n j u r i e s .
Ar

DATED t h i s

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)

day of December, 1984.

:SS .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

lC fc

day of

December, 1984.

>mmiL
NOTARYTPUBLr
R e s i d i n g a t B a i t Lake County, UT

My commission expires

ln-(o- %'
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AFFIDAVIT OF ORDELL STEPHENS

ORDELL STEPHENS, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That affiant was a member o (f a jury impaneled

in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Inc , et al., Civil No,
6749, commenced November 30, 1982, before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial District Court of Summit County,
State of Utah.
2.

That during its deliberations, said jury became

confused due to the nature of the special] verdict and regarding
the effect their finding of contributory inegligency would have
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbq, Inc.
3.

That affiant in his representative capacity as

a juror requested additional instruction from the Court in a
desire to eliminate the confusion.
4.

That the Court refused the request and, instead,

referred the jury to instructions already given.
5.

That said jury returned a special verdict estab-

lishing plaintiff Lingwall 707o negligent and defendant Dalbo,
Inc. , 307o negligent.

In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was

found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident.

APPENDIX A-2

6.

That the aforementioned verdict did not result

in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall
to recover some damages in compensation for his injuries.
DATED this

[L

day of December, 1984.

ORDELL STEPHENS

STATE OF UTAH

/

)
• sS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

| [ ' day

of December, 1984.

LUa>.

i V^.i'v'wU^

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake County, UT
My commission expires:

i A-fit
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AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN HOtT

KEVIN HOYT, being first duly swprn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That affiant was a member o (f a jury impaneled

in the litigation of Belden v. Dalbo, Inc , et al., Civil No,
6749, commenced November 30, 1982, before) the Honorable
Homer F. Wilkinson, in the Third Judicial! District Court of
Summit County, State of Utah.
2.

That during its deliberations, said jury became

confused due to the nature of the specialf verdict and regarding
the effect their finding of contributory negligence would have
on the parties, Martin Lingwall and Dalbd>, Inc.
3.

That affiant in his representative capacity as

a juror requested additional instruction from the Court in a
desire to eliminate the confusion.
That the Court refused the request and, instead,
referred the jury to instructions already given.
5.

That said jury returned a ppecial verdict estab-

lishing plaintiff Lingwall 10% negligent and defendant Dalbo,
Inc. , 307o negligent.

In addition, plaintiff Lingwall was

found to have suffered $69,083.00 in damages from the accident,

APPENDIX A-3

6.

That the aforementioned verdict did not result

in the effect desired by the jury, namely, that the plaintiff
Lingwall was non-suited when the jury had intended Mr. Lingwall
to recover some damages in compensation for his injuries.
DATED this

STATE OF UTAH

/0

day of December, 1984.

)
i ss

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
December, 19 84.

JU^day OJ

A

ML

muL

lOTARY Pl| BLrc—
Res idling a t S a l t Lake County, UT

My commission expires:
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AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN L. f^ENRIOD

STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, being f i r s t duly s^vorn deposes and states as
follows:
1.

That the affiant is an attorney for t|he firm of Nielsen £• Senior,

Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

That affiant, as counsel, represented the plaintiff,

Lingwall, in the litigation, Beldon v.

Dalbo,

Inc. let al.,

1982, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,

Martin

R.

heard November 30,

and a j u r y ,

in the

Third

Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah.
3.

That

during

its

deliberations,

the

jury

became

confused

regarding the effect their finding of comparative negligence would have on the
parties.
4.

That the j u r y requested additional instruction to eliminate said

5.

That the court denied said request a|nd instead referred the j u r y

confusion.

to the instructions already given.
6.

That the aforementioned, though not recorded by the court, was

witnessed by affiant and other members of the bencfp and court.

APPENDIX A-4

f

DATED t h i s

STATE OF UTAH

y

day of December, 1984.

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o before ime t h i s

d a y of December,

1004

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in
xQ^JJ"

My Commission E x p i r e s :

-2-

/fZlJ?

/

